近十年会出现第三次世界大战 印度吗?

  第三次世界大战,远古预言家超时空所描述的满天飞弹,满世界火海连天。就是大战中世界各战区陸基,空天所不断发射飞向毁灭目标的各种现代化导弹,毁灭破坏的程度百倍于预言家的时空描述!第三次世界大战预言时间,第三次世界大战会爆发吗?  美国媒体16日发表题为“如果第三次世界大战在亚洲开打”的文章推演了第三次世界大战在亚洲爆发的可能性。最近一段时间,有关第三次世界大战的多篇文章出现在西方媒体上。有关媒体以美苏在冷战时期进行争霸作为推演的基础,但中国军事专家李杰认为,这实际上是打着“以史为鉴”的幌子在针对中国,而且美国不仅在这样喊着,也在亚太地区逐步落实与部署着针对中国的战略意图。  用美苏冲突影射中美海上动武  文章称,作为上世纪70年代和80年代的全球军事演习的一部分,美国海军战争学院研究了第三次世界大战在亚洲开战的可能性。在1979年至1988年之间,每年都会进行一次推演,每一次演习都揭示了超级大国间爆发冲突的不同战略和技术层面结果。尽管通常聚焦于欧洲,但演习同样也包括东亚。尽管早期的演习出现了一些变动(受中越军事冲突影响),但它们有着基本相同的模式:苏联一方防守,美国和盟军海军不断蚕食苏联基地,并试图影响苏联在欧洲的注意力。  第三次世界大战可能在亚洲爆发  文章称,在最糟糕的情况下,战争可能在亚洲的多个地带打响,包括朝鲜半岛、日本、中苏边界。比如在美军1984年的演习中,美军假想苏联对日本发动了空中和导弹袭击。日本的大部分空中力量被摧毁,美国驻日本的空中力量也遭到摧毁。苏联还通过潜艇以及民用舰船的掩护,对美国在太平洋的基地发动了非常规袭击。  在目前的国际形势下,为什么要重提这段历史呢?中国军事专家李杰17日对记者表示,这种推演貌似“以史为鉴”,实际上针对中国的意思非常明显。这种推演看起来还是在用冷战思维来回顾美苏之间的海上大规模编队较量,而实际上是在影射中美未来可能会爆发的大规模海上冲突乃至战争,因为未来10-20年间,俄美基本上没有发生大规模海上冲突的可能性,俄罗斯舰队没有足够数量的大型水面舰艇。  李杰认为,美媒以推演美苏之间爆发世界大战为幌子,掩盖自身真实的想法和意图:美国要在东亚前沿,特别是南海地区部署更多先进装备,以应对可能会发生的一定规模的中美海上冲突。美国不仅是这样计划的,而且已经在逐渐落实与部署之中,最近“斯坦尼斯”号航母编队不断在南海地区活动,未来亚太地区很可能保持双航母编队的存在,必要情况下甚至会有3个航母编队同时存在。日本向南海地区派出的潜艇与水面舰艇是一支反潜能力很强的编队,未来协助美军威慑我们在南海活动的战略核潜艇和潜艇。美国还在加速研制“海上猎人”无人船,将来有可能作为最前期、最前沿部署的反潜和扫雷的兵力,并与X-47B构成新型无人化、智能化的武器搭配。
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发表时间: 09:35
美媒:第三次世界大战的可能性有多大? &&
菜古子 发表在
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  正文翻译
  Assessing the similarities and differences between 1914 and 2014
  评估1914年与2014年(全球局势)的异同之处
  A century ago this month, Europeans stood on the brink of a war so devastating that it forced historians to create a new category: “World War.” None of the leaders at the time could imagine the wasteland they would inhabit four years later. By 1918, each had lost what he cherished most: the kaiser dismissed, the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved, the tsar overthrown by the Bolsheviks, France bled for a generation, and England shorn of the flower of its youth and treasure. A millennium in which European leaders had been masters of the globe came to a crashing halt.
  在一个世纪之前的这一月, 整个欧洲都处在一场战争的边缘,这场战争如此之惨烈以至于历史学家不得不生造出一个类词“世界大战”来描述它。没有一个(当时欧洲国家)的领导人能预见到仅仅4年之后他们将和(他们的国民)生活在一片废墟之上。到1918年,每一个(战争参与人)都失去了他们所珍惜的事物:威廉二世逊位,奥匈帝国解体,沙俄被布尔斯维克篡夺,法兰西持续一个时代的流血,英格兰失去了其年轻一代的有生力量以及世代积累的财富。 欧洲人曾几何时处在世界之巅的风光被那场世纪大战无情抹杀。
  What caused this catastrophe? President John F. Kennedy enjoyed needling colleagues with that question. He would then remind them of his favorite answer, quoting German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg: “Ah, if we only knew.” When, in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Kennedy found himself “eyeball to eyeball” with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, making decisions that he knew could mean quick death to 100 million people, he reflected on the lessons of 1914. At several decision points, he adjusted what he was inclined to do in an effort to avoid repeating those leaders’ mistakes.
  是什么造成了这场悲剧? 约翰肯尼迪总统喜欢一针见血的驳斥他的下属针对该问题的回答。他随后会提醒他们什么才是他喜欢的***:引自德国前总理霍尔韦格的说法:&哎, 早知今日,何必当初。& 因此,当肯尼迪总统发现1962年的古巴导弹危机将他与苏联总书记赫鲁晓夫推至 “刺刀见红“的程度, 任何一国轻举妄动
  都会引发一场一亿人死亡的世界危机时,欧洲1914年的惨痛经历让他反省。起码在某些决议点上,肯尼迪总统都对他自己的本意做出了调整,力免重复欧洲(1914年)时任领导人所犯下的错误。
  As they were choosing to fulfill commitments, or not, to mobilize forces sooner or later, the participants in the First World War were simultaneously seeking to frame public perceptions of the crisis. Each sought to blame its adversary. In the aftermath of the catastrophe, the victors took considerable liberty with the facts to justify punishing the vanquished. The Treaty of Versailles imposed such draconian penalties that it created conditions in which, just two decades later, the Second World War erupted. This larger drama has understandably shaped historians’ accounts of the causes of the war. But as the best of the new books on this conflict, Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers, concludes forthrightly, the available evidence can be marshaled to support an array of competing claims. “The outbreak of war in 1914 is not an Agatha Christie drama at the end of which we will discover the culprit standing over a corpse in the conservatory with a smoking pistol,” Clark writes. “There is no smoki or, rather, there is one in the hands of every major character.”
  (1914年)时任欧洲领导人们在履行承诺派兵遣将的同时,也不忘在各国国内进行战前宣传,每国都不遗余力的诋毁其敌国。战后,战胜国在对如何惩罚战败国的决议上也有相当大的自由。凡尔赛条约(对战败国)的处罚是如此之严厉以至于仅仅20年之后,第二次世界大战爆发。(条约的签订)这一出戏码极大的丰富了历史学家总结二战爆发的原因库。但是正如针对二战总结最好(作者认为)的新书“梦游者”(作者克里斯托弗.克拉克)-该书考证详实,内容整理后即为有影响力的二战调查文献-所直言般:“1914年爆发的战争并不是像阿加莎.克里斯蒂所描写的戏剧一般结尾,即在一所音乐学院,凶手站在一具尸体旁,手上的***正冒着烟;”克拉克写到:“在一战的故事里我们看不到冒烟的***,或者说,每个参演者手上都有***。”
  In this centennial of what participants named the “Great War,” many have recalled Mark Twain’s observation that while history never repeats itself, it does sometimes rhyme. As a rising China claims islands administered by Japan in the East China Sea, or controlled by neighbors in the South China Sea, many hear echoes of events in the Balkans a century earlier. Could an incident between Chinese and Japanese naval or air forces lead to the sinking of a ship or downing of a plane? If so, would the U.S. meet its treaty commitment to stand with Japan, even if that meant firing on Chinese ships or planes? If it did so, could events escalate to a larger war between the U.S. and China? It seems (and I believe, in fact, is) unlikely. But according to a recent Pew poll, large majorities of citizens in nations throughout Asia believe China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors will lead to war.
  在这场被与会者称为“伟大战争”的百年祭上,很多人都想起了马克吐温的名言:历史总是进步,但总是有人觉得它在重复过去。当崛起的中国开始宣称东海钓鱼岛以及南海诸多他国占领岛屿的所有权时,每个人都好像看到100年前的巴尔干事件正在重演。中日海空军的冲突会不会造成船只沉没,飞机失事呢?如果发生了,美国会履行承诺,站在日本这边,即便这承诺意味着要向中国的船只跟飞机开火呢? 如果美国真如此做了,会不会将冲突升级为中美之间的战争呢? 这看上去不可能(私以为这绝对不可能)。但是根据皮尤研究中心近期针对主要亚洲国家公民的民意调查,中国与其领国的领土纷争将会将亚洲卷入战争。
  Historical analogies like 1914 can be fertile sources of insights about contemporary challenges. One danger, however, is that people can find an analogy so compelling that they conclude that current conditions are “just like” 1914. My late, great colleague Ernest May provided an appropriate antidote. He noted that as a matter of fact, the most common form of analysis used by leaders in crises is historical reasoning from analogies. He urged both analysts and policymakers to be more systematic about the effort. In a legendary course taught at Harvard for many years, he challenged students attracted by a historical analogy to follow a simple procedure: put the analogy as the headline then draw a straight line down the middle of the page and write “similar” at the top of one column and “different” at the top of the other. Under each column, list at least three points that capture similarities and three that note differences between the analog and the current case.
  如拿1914年于今日类比,很多人都能从逝去的历史中说出自己对当今挑战的深刻见解。通过类比人们也可发现,现今最为危险的就是,这相似之处是如此之大,现在亚洲局势几乎是1914年(欧洲)的翻版。
  我的一位了不起的已故同事-欧内斯特.梅-对 “翻版”这一词有自己的见解。 他曾经指出国家领导人在危急时刻做出来的分析很多时候都是通过“类比”推导出来的。然后他认为分析家以及政策制定者在推导的时候应更具系统性。他曾执教哈弗大学一门具有传奇色彩的课程多时,在课堂上他要求学生通过以下步骤来进行历史类比:将类比写在一张纸的抬头正中间处-从该处从上而下画一条直线将纸分成两半-左边一栏写 ”相似”;右边一栏写“不同”-至少在每一栏下都归纳出三条能够总结历史事件与当今形势的异同之处。
  This essay attempts to use the “May Method” to highlight seven salient similarities and seven instructive differences between the challenges confronting Chinese and American leaders today and those facing world leaders in 1914. While most of the similarities make the possibility of conflict today more plausible that it might otherwise seem, and most of the differences make conflict seem less plausible, instructively, some have the opposite effect.
  所以我的这篇文章就试图根据“梅方法”来标注现今中美对峙和1914年欧洲领导人对峙的七处明显的相似和七处显著地差异。相似之处可能会让人觉得冲突不可避免,差异之处又会让人觉得冲突不会发生,当然有的人可能会有相反的想法。
  The USS Arizona returns to New York after escorting Woodrow Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference, in 1918. (Wikimedia Commons)
  USS亚利桑那号在完成护送威尔森总统赴巴黎和会会谈后返回纽约,摄于1918年。(维基共享资源)
  Similarities
  相似之处
  1. “Thucydides’s Trap”: structural stress that inevitably occurs when a rapidly rising power rivals a ruling power. As Thucydides observed about ancient Greece, an ascendant Athens naturally became more ambitious, assertive, arrogant, and even hubristic. Predictably, this instilled fear, anxiety, and defensiveness among the leaders of Sparta.
  1、“修昔底德的陷阱”:当急速崛起的国家开始挑战(区域)统治强权时,结构应力不可避免。正如修昔底德对古希腊的观察一般:上升时期的雅典城邦越是具有野心,自信,傲慢甚至越发不可一世时,可预见的就是斯巴达的领袖就会越发恐惧,焦虑以及提防。
  译者注:修昔底德的陷阱:指一个新崛起的大国必然要挑战现存大国,而现存大国也必然来回应这种威胁,这样战争变得不可避免。这一概念来自修昔底德的名言“使战争不可避免的真正原因是雅典势力的增长和因而引起斯巴达的恐惧”――修昔底德《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》第一卷第一章,商务印书馆2013年版。
  Accustomed to economic primacy, naval dominance, and an empire on which the sun never set, Britain in 1914 viewed with alarm the unified German Reich that had overtaken it in industrial production and research, that was demanding a greater sphere of influence, and that was expanding its military capability to include a navy that could challenge Britain’s control of the seas. In the decade before the war, this led Britain to abandon a century of “splendid isolation” to tighten entanglements with France and then Russia. During the same period, German military planners watched with alarm as Russia rushed to complete railways that could allow it to move forces rapidly to the borders of Germany and its faltering Austro-Hungarian ally.
  当时经济实力,海军统治力独步天下的号称“日不落帝国”的英国在1914年被一个统一的,在工业制造领域已经赶超英国的,进而要求更多全球影响力和军事实力来挑战英国海军统治的德国所警醒,从而在开战近十年前不得不结束其100多年来的“光辉孤立”政策而与法国和俄国越发联系紧密。在同一时期,德国也被俄国所警醒,俄国在短时间内完成了铁路网的铺建,从而能够短时间大规模地将部队运至俄德,俄奥边界。
  In 2014, what for most Americans is our natural, God-given position as “Number One” is being challenged by an emerging China on track to surpass the United States in the next decade as the world’s largest economy. As China has grown more powerful, it has become more active and even aggressive in its neighborhood, particularly in what it believes are the rightly named “China” seas to its east and south. Fearful neighbors from Japan and the Philippines to Vietnam naturally look to the U.S. for support in its role as the guardian of what since World War II has been an American Pax Pacifica.
  在2014年,美国头后大国的事实-这被大多数美国国民看做是神赐-正在被急速崛起的中国所挑战。中国在下一个十年将会取代美国成为第一大经济体。随着中国国力增强,他对其领国,特别是由其国名命名的海域-中国海-上的领土以及势力要求变的越发主动,甚至是极具侵略性。日本,菲律宾,越南等国深感恐惧,纷纷寄希望于美国的援助。毕竟美国至二战开始就是该地区的守护者,太平洋也曾经仅仅是美国的内湖。
  2. The virtual inconceivability of “total” war.
  2. 几乎无法预见的“全面”战争
  In 1914, aside from occasional small wars and colonial smackdowns, war was “out of fashion.” The best-selling book of the era by Norman Angell argued that war was a “great illusion,” since the nominal winner would certainly lose more than it could possibly gain.
  尽管在1914年,小规模的战斗和殖民地起义事件此起彼伏,战争这个词不被主流大众所接受。其时由诺曼安格尔所著的畅销书宣称战争只是 ”大幻觉“, 因为名义上的胜者(通过战争所)失去的远远大于其可能所得。
  In 2014, the “long peace” since World War II, reinforced by nuclear weapons and economic globalization, makes all-out war between great powers so obviously self-defeating that it seems unthinkable.
  在2014年,二战之后的“长久和平“,伴随着核威慑和经济全球化,让世人觉得大国之间的战争只是“站不住脚”的,所以几乎是不能想象的。
  3. Thick interdependence: economic, social, and political.
  3. 紧密的相互依赖:经济,社会,政治
  In 1914, the U.K. and Germany were each other’s major European trading partner and principal foreign investor. King George and Kaiser Wilhelm were first cousins, the latter having sat by the deathbed of his grandmother, Queen Victoria, in 1901, and marched as second only to George at the funeral of George’s father, King Edward VII, in 1910. Elites of both societies studied at each other’s major universities, were partners in business, and socialized together.
  在1914年,英德是彼此在欧洲内最大的交易伙伴和主要的国外投资对象。乔治国王和威廉皇帝是表兄弟。威廉皇帝甚至在其祖母-维多利亚女王-1901年时驾崩还守候在旁,在乔治国王之父-爱德华七世-的葬礼上还是仅次于乔治王的抬棺人。两国的精英都曾在彼国的主要大学学习,在经济上是伙伴关系,也共同参加社交活动。
  In 2014, China is the United States’ second-largest trading partner, the U.S. the largest buyer of Chinese exports, and China the largest foreign holder of American debt. A quarter of a million Chinese students study annually in American universities, including most recently Chinese President Xi Jinping’s only daughter.
  在2014年,中国是美国第二大贸易伙伴,美国购买最多中国商品,中国持有最多美国国债。每年有超过25万的中国学生-包括xi的女儿-在美国大学读书。
  4. Rising nationalism that accentuates territorial disputes.
  4.民族主义抬头,领土纠纷加剧
  In 1914, as the Ottoman Empire unraveled, Serbian nationalists aspired to create a greater Serbia, and Russia and Austria-Hungary competed for influence among the Ottoman successor states in the Balkans. Meanwhile, resurgent Germans planned for a larger Germany and French patriots dreamed about recapturing Alsace-Lorraine, provinces taken by Germany from France after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870C71.
  在1914年,奥斯曼帝国亡国,塞尔维亚民族分子希望建立大塞尔维亚,沙俄跟奥匈帝国皆希望在巴尔干地区奥斯曼帝国的继承国家中施加影响力。当是时,复兴的德国计划建立大德意志帝国,法国爱国者则希望德国归还其在年间普法战争中被割让给德国的阿尔萨-洛林地区。
  In 2014, China’s claim to the Senkaku Islands administered by Japan in the last China Sea, and the “9-dash line” by which it asserts ownership of the entire South China Sea, are reflections of ambitions that are defining new facts in the surrounding waters, exciting nationalism among its neighbors and in its own population.
  在2014年,中国对东海上日本所占据的钓鱼岛提出领土要求。9段线也将整个南中国海涵括在中国领海之内。中国正在重新制定周边领海的势力现存状况,激起周边国家以及本国人民的民族主义诉求。
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----------------------------------------------我一直在思考一个问题
这个世界到底是谁在管
张友人?释迦牟尼?穆罕默德?耶和华?
回复时间: 09:36
  5. Powerful military establishments focused on a primary enemy for the purposes of planning and buying (and justifying defense budgets).
  5. 针对某一主要敌国的有力军事部署,达到计划,购买以及调整国防预算的目的。
  In 1914, Britain and Germany’s militaries viewed each other as major threats, Germany and Russia saw the other as major rivals, and France was focused on the danger posed by Germany.
In 1907, as Germany’s naval expansion approached the point at which it could challenge British naval primacy, the British prime minister asked the leading analyst in the foreign ministry for a memorandum “on the present State of British relations with France and Germany.” That now-famous document written by Eyre Crowe predicted that Germany would not only establish the strongest army on the continent, but also “build as powerful a navy as she can afford.” Germany’s pursuit of what the memorandum called “political hegemony and maritime ascendency” would pose a threat to the “independence of her neighbors and ultimately the existence of England.”
  在1914年,英国和德国将彼此看做主要的军事威胁;德国与俄国则将对方看做主要竞争对手;法国则视德国为其最主要威胁。在1907年,当德国的海军力量发展到足以挑战英国海军霸权的临界点时,时任英国首相要求外交部的首席分析家做一份“英国与法德的现有关系”的备忘录。 这份现在非常出名的由艾尔.克洛撰写的备忘录预言到:德国不仅仅只会满足于建立欧洲大陆最为强大的陆军,它也会竭尽全力来创建强大的海军力量。这份备忘录将德国的野望归纳为:外交政策上的霸权以及海事力量上的优势-这将对其邻国以及-最终-对英国的存亡带来威胁。
  Today, the U.S. Department of Defense plans against something it calls the “Anti-Access/Area Denial threat,” a thinly veiled “you know who” for China. Since its humiliation in 1996, when it was forced to back down from threats to Taiwan after the U.S. sent two aircraft carriers to support Taiwan, China has planned, built, and trained to push U.S. naval forces back beyond Taiwan to the first island chain and eventually to the second.
  今日,美国国防部赤裸裸的针对中国而谋划一些类似于“遏制/封锁”的计划。1996年对中国来说是耻辱之年,美国仅仅派遣两所航母就打消其可能针对台湾的军事活动,因此,中国卧薪求胆,处心积虑的期求将美国的海军力量退至第一岛链,进而退至第二岛链。
  6. Entangling alliances that create what Henry Kissinger has called a “diplomatic doomsday machine.”
  6. 通过进一步加强盟约来打造如亨利.基辛格所说的“外交末日机器”。
  In 1914, a web of complex alliance commitments threatened rapid escalation into Great Power war. After unifying Germany in the late nineteenth century, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck constructed a network of alliances that would keep the peace in Europe while isolating Germany’s principal enemy, France. Kaiser Wilhelm wrecked Bismarck’s finely tuned alliance structure by refusing to extend Germany’s alliance with Russia in 1890. Two years later, Russia allied with France. This led Germany to strengthen its ties to Austria-Hungary, and Britain to entertain deeper entanglement with both France and Russia.
  在1914年,复杂的盟约关系网加速了有可能将欧洲推向列强混战局面的步伐。俾斯麦在19世纪晚期统一德国后,构建了将法国-德国的主要敌国-排除在外的欧洲和平盟约。威廉二世-通过在1890年拒绝与俄国达成合约-则将俾斯麦的合约架构弃之作古。2年之后,俄国与法国结盟。这些都导致德国进一步与奥匈帝国加强联系,同时,英国与法俄的接触也进一步深入。
  In 2014, in East Asia, the United States has many allies, China few. American obligations and operational plans cover a spectrum from the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which obligates the U.S. to regard any attack upon Japan as an attack on the U.S., to agreements with the Philippines and others that require only consultation and support. As an assertive China defines air identification zones, drills for oil and gas in contested areas, excludes other states’ ships from waters around disputed islands, and operates ships and aircraft to redraw “rules of the road,” it becomes easier to imagine scenarios in which mistakes or miscalculation lead to results no one would have chosen.
  在2014年,美国在东亚有诸多盟友,中国则很少。美国通过美日安保条约-条约规定如若有第三国攻击日本则相当于攻击美国本土-以及与菲律宾的合约还有和其他国家签订的提供咨询和援助的条约,在亚洲有责任和能力做很多事情。当傲慢的中国开始划定航空识别区,在有争议地区搭建油气钻井,阻止其他国家的船只进入有争议岛屿海域以及动用海空军事力量来重新制定区域规则的时候,任何错误的,误算的举动都会轻易的让局势走向至任何人都被动的局面。
  7. Temptation of a coup de main to radically improve power and prestige.
  7.通过“突袭”来提升国力以及威望的诱惑
  In 1914, a declining Austria-Hungary faced rising, Russian-backed Pan-Slavism in the Balkans. Seeing Serbia as the epicenter of Pan-Slavism, Emperor Franz Joseph imagined that this menace could be contained by a decisive defeat of Serbia. The assassination of his heir, Franz Ferdinand, provided an opportunity.
  在1914年,正在衰退的奥匈帝国面对的是一个由俄国支持的泛斯拉夫主义盛行的巴尔干半岛。塞尔维亚被奥匈皇帝弗兰茨约瑟夫视作泛斯拉夫主义的中心,约瑟夫认为只有通过在军事上果断的击败塞尔维亚,(泛斯拉夫主义)才能得到遏制。奥匈帝国皇位继承人费迪南德大公的遇刺为约瑟夫提供了绝好的军事借口。
  In 2014, Shinzo Abe seeks to reverse Japan’s “lost decades.” A quarter-century ago, Japan appeared to be on the threshold of becoming “Number One.” Since then, it has stagnated economically and become almost irrelevant in international politics. Abe’s program for revival thus includes not only “Abenomics,” but also restoration of Japanese influence in the world, including revision of the constitution and expansion of Japan’s military forces to meet what he explicitly calls the “China threat.”
  在2014年,安倍晋三试图将日本从“失落的十年”中唤醒。仅仅在20年前,日本还处在能否成为世界老大的分水岭上。在那之后,日本的经济发展陷入僵局,国际外交影响力几乎为0. 安倍的日本复兴计划并不仅仅只是“安倍经济学”,他还寄希望通过修改日本宪法,扩张日本军力来应对安倍所明确指明的“中国威胁”, 从而扩大日本的国际影响力。
  In sum, those who see reminders of events a century ago in developments today are not deluded. But as Professor May would remind us, on the other hand, there are significant differences as well.
  总的来说,那些通过一个世纪以前的事情来断言今日走向的人们并不是信口开河。但是正如梅教授所说过的一样,今日与一个世纪以前的世界,在另一方面来说,有很多显著的不同。
  Differences
  1. Clash of civilizations: As argued by Samuel Huntington in his Clash of Civilizations, deep differences in values and worldviews between civilizations are a significant systemic factor favoring conflict. On this dimension, 2014 is more dangerous than a century ago.
  1.文明的冲突: 正如萨缪尔.亨廷顿在他的书中“文明的冲突”所论证的那样,系统上来说,两个文明如若价值观,世界观有很大不同的话,很可能会起冲突。在这一层面上来说的话,2014年相较于一个世纪前来说更为危险。
  In 1914, Europe was the epicenter of civilization and its leaders masters of the universe. Most of the crowned heads of Europe―from the Arctic Circle to the Mediterranean―were blood relatives, with the tsar and the kaiser addressing each other as Nicky and Willy. Nonetheless, as Huntington noted, a fault line between Western Civilization and Eastern Orthodoxy ran right through the Balkans.
  在1914年,欧洲是世界文明的中心,欧洲领导人统治着世界。大多数欧洲的君主-从北极圈到地中海-彼此之前都有血缘关系,例如德国皇帝和沙俄皇帝称呼彼此为“尼克和威利”。尽管如此,巴尔干地区任然是西方文明和东正教的分界线。
  In 2014, China and the United States are separated by more than just the Pacific Ocean. Significant differences between values in Beijing and Washington include hierarchical harmony vs. communal values vs. and the Communist Party’s monopoly of political power vs. democracy.
  在2014年,中美之间的隔着的并不仅仅是太平洋。 北京和华盛顿之间有太多显著性的价值观的不同:等级制的和谐vs自由;集体价值观vs个人主义;***独裁政治vs民主。
  2. Financial foundations of hegemonic power.
  2. 霸权国家的财力基础
  In 1914, Great Britain was the world’s largest creditor.
  在1914年,大不列颠是世界上最大的债权国。
  In 2014, the United States is the largest debtor in the world. As a result of a combination of low taxes and high spending, Washington has borrowed more than $17 trillion. Much of this comes from foreign lenders, with the largest share held by China. America’s position as both a debtor and as the major market for Chinese products, matched by China’s position as America’s banker and major supplier of consumer goods, create conditions that have been called MADE (Mutual Assured Destruction of Economies).
  在2014年,美国是世界上最大的债务国。由于低税收和高支出的双重影响,美国迄今已经举债17万亿美元。美国的债务大多数来自外国,其中中国是美国最大的债权持有人。美国是中国最大的债务人,同时又是中国最大的海外市场,相对而言的,中国是美国最大的债权人,也是美国最大的商品供应人,这一事实可以用MADE这一词来概括。(MADE:互相保证毁灭性经济 )
  3. Shared geography.
  3. 地理共享
  In 1914, the European competitors had contiguous physical borders. This created incentives for rapid mobilization, accelerating the pace of decision-making in crisis.
  在1914年, 欧洲列强之间都有接壤。 这一方面激发快速军事动员,另一方面加速了在危机下的决策制定。
  In 2014, the U.S. and China are oceans and even hemispheres apart. Nonetheless, as a Pacific power with alliances and bases throughout Asia, the U.S. is a constant presence in the seas adjacent to China. Moreover, as a result of advances in technology, there are no borders in space and cyberspace. In these realms, the possibility that rapid advances could achieve (or be imagined to have achieved) decisive advantages raises the specter of “crisis instability,” reminiscent of Europe in the early twentieth century.
  在2014年,中美两国分处两大半球,中间隔着浩瀚的大洋。尽管如此,美国由于其在亚太的盟友和军事基地,其军事存在与中国毗海而邻。更进一步来说,由于科技的进步,在太空以及网络空间毫无边界可言。在这些领域,任何已获得的(或者是可望获得的)科技的进步都会取得决定性的优势-20世纪初萦绕在欧洲上空的“危机不稳定性”的幽灵让人历历在目。
  4. Nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.
  4.核武器和大规模杀伤性武器。
  In 1914, the thought that a Pan-European war could be so devastating that it would end a millennium in which European leaders ruled the world was almost inconceivable.
  在1914年,所有的时任欧洲领导人都没有预知到这场泛欧战争如此之惨烈,竟然会毁掉欧洲的黄金时代。
  In 2014, nuclear weapons have a “crystal-ball effect” that allows leaders to see clearly that escalation to a nuclear war could erase their nations from the map.
  在2014年,核武器正如水晶预言球般,一国领袖很清楚的知道,升级到核战的战争会轻而易举的将其国家在地图上抹去。
  5. Military balance.
  5.军事力量的平衡。
  In 1914, the balance of military power among the major states of Europe was fragile. The U.K. had the world’s greatest navy, Germany had the strongest army, and the capabilities of Russia and France were significant. Moreover, all of the states were active participants in a delicate game of power-balancing.
  在1914年,列强之间的军事平衡是非常脆弱的。英国有当世最强大的海军,德国有最强大的陆军,法俄的战争潜力巨大。更进一步来说,诸多列强都主动参与这场精细的力量平衡的博弈。
  In 2014, the U.S. military is without equal. After two decades in which it spent more on defense than all other countries combined, America has by far the best-trained and best-armed fighting forces on earth. For the foreseeable future, no rational Chinese military planner could present a war plan to defeat the U.S. military on the battlefield, even in East Asia. On the other hand, after more than a decade of what two-thirds of Americans now judge to have been misguided wars, the U.S. is war-weary and war-wary. Assessing the will and capabilities of the U.S. today, China could be tempted to take excessive risks.
  在2014年,美国的军事实力一时无二。连续20年的军费开支都是远超其他国家的总和,美国建立了地球上装备最好,战斗素养最高的军队。在可预见的未来,没有一个理智的中国军事家会认为中国能够在战场上击败美国,即便是在东亚。从另一方面来说,三分之二的美国人认为美国十年来的军事行动是不正当的,他们厌战,恐战。错误的估计美国的战意和战争潜力,可能会引诱中国冒巨大风险(与美国开战)。
  6. Technology and transparency.
  6.科技以及透明度。
  In 1914, Russia and France feared that Germany could mobilize in secret. Uncertainty about mutual mobilization timetables and troop movements contributed mightily to the dynamics of escalation. Governments sent cables to ambassadors who transmitted messages to foreign offices, increasing the chances of miscommunication.
  在1914年,俄法担心德国会秘密的军事动员。对对方动员时间安排以及军队动向的不确定性会极大的将战争危机升级。政府对向国外传递信息的大使发送电报可能也会增加错误交流的几率。
  In 2014, intelligence systems provide near-real-time information on movements of ships, aircraft, and troops. This information equips leaders with significantly more and better information to make decisions in a crisis. Moreover, they can talk directly to one another by telephone and video teleconference.
  在2014年, 智能系统能够将船只,飞机,部队处收集来的信息以几乎实时的方式呈现。这些信息能够让领导人获得更多更好的信息来在危急时刻做决策。更重要的是,(敌对国)的领导人能通过***和视频会议的方式和彼此沟通。
  7. Structure of world politics.
  7.世界政局形势。
  In 1914, global politics were clearly multi-polar, making delicate balancing essential, and miscalculation difficult to avoid.
  在1914年,世界是很明显的多极世界。这导致维持微妙平衡极为重要,(国与国)之间行动的误算也难以避免。
  In 2014, the U.S. remains the sole superpower in a world that is, on current trendlines, evolving toward polarity: bi-polarity with China, or even multi-polarity if Europe becomes a player, India rises to the ranks of a great power, and Russia is able to sustain its new assertiveness. Chinese or Russian miscalculations about the relative balance of power pose potential risks.
  在2014年,美国任然是世界上唯一的超级大国。在现有的发展趋势来说世界可能会呈多极发展:中美双极世界;中美欧(盟)多极世界。印度也正在崛起为一个大国;俄罗斯正在重塑其自信。中国或者俄国对当前相对平衡关系的误算都有可能引发潜在的冲突。
  So which are more salient: the similarities or differences? Weighing the array on both sides, would a Martian strategist comparing conditions in January 1914 with those at the beginning of 2014 judge the likelihood today of great-power war significantly higher or lower? For the “complacent” who live in what Gore Vidal labeled the “United States of Amnesia,” the similarities should serve as a vivid reminder that many of the reasons currently given for discounting threats of war did not prevent World War I. In particular, the fact that war would be irrational does not make it unthinkable. For “alarmists” who extrapolate from the past to predict imminent disaster, the May Method provides a salutary correction. For myself, this exercise in historical analysis leads me to conclude that the probability of war between the U.S. and China in the decade ahead is higher than I imagined before examining the analogy―but still unlikely. If statesmen in both the U.S. and China reflect on what happened a century ago, perspective and insights from this past can be applied now to make risks of war even lower.
  您觉得哪一方面更为重要?相同或差异? 通过对比这两方面的因素,军事战略家会认为与1914年春相比,2014年年初的状况会更容易或者说更难以让主要列强之间发生战争呢?对那些活在戈尔维达尔所说的的“失忆合众国”的掉以轻心的人来说,这些相似之处-不管有多少原因让现在的人们觉得战争威胁很渺茫,这些同样的原因都没有阻止一战的爆发-是一个鲜活的战争警示。对那些照搬过去来预言即将爆发战争的杞人忧天者来说,梅方法提供了很好的修正。对于我来说,在做这个类比之前,我没有想到这次历史分析让我得到的中美之间开战的几率会高于我的预期-但我仍然不认为中美之间会开战。如果中美的发言人都能从一个世纪之前的战争中有所反省,以古鉴今的话,未来开战的可能性会更加之低。
----------------------------------------------我一直在思考一个问题
这个世界到底是谁在管
张友人?释迦牟尼?穆罕默德?耶和华?
回复时间: 09:37
  评论翻译
  Ron Couples • 2 days ago
  Both World Wars began quite some time before America&s direct military involvement. For this reason, it would seem that over-emphasis on the possibility of war between the U.S. and China might cloud our thinking about the possibility of another world war. While America came to terms with its World War II enemies and actually assisted in the rebuilding of Germany and Japan, the rivalries, strong emotions and even hatred in the greater China/Japan region remain largely unresolved. If China continues to forcibly create &facts on the ground,& it can be argued that the chances of the world stumbling into global war are at least as great today as they were before WW I and WW II.
  两次世界大战都发生了一段时间后美国才介入。所以,过度强调中美战争的可能性可能会让我们忽视了发生另外一场世界大战的可能性。战后,美国与自己在二战中的敌人德国和日本达成协议,而且还帮助这两个国家进行重建,但是中日之间的竞争、情绪甚至是仇恨依旧没能得到解决。如果中国继续在领土问题上制造“既成事实”,那么如今发生世界大战的可能性与一战二战的几率一样大。
  BrianDT Ron Couples • a day ago
  Or China v. Russia. They have some hostility leftover from WWII. It makes perfect sense for China to try to grab Eastern Russian territories. There are minerals, some oil and more land. It is unclear where the US would end up in that war but both sides would certainly try to draw us in on their side.
  BrianDT罗恩夫妇•天前
  或者中国对抗俄罗斯。因为二战,两个国家现在还存在着历史纠葛。中国完全有可能占领俄罗斯东部领土。该地区富含矿产石油和土地资源。一旦中俄发生战争,不知道美国会站在哪一边,但是双方肯定都会来拉拢美国站在自己这一边。
  DrNobelDynamite BrianDT • a day ago
  China grabbing pieces of eastern Russia makes sense until you consider the atomic trump car Russia has. Even with a depleted population and even if their economy takes another dive, they&ll be able to lob nukes into whatever invading/occupying force China can send and make occupation next to impossible.
  想想俄罗斯所拥有的核武器,中国是不太可能占领俄罗斯东部领土的。尽管俄罗斯人口在下降,而且即使俄罗斯经济再次下滑,俄罗斯也完全有可能把入侵的中国军队炸得灰飞烟灭的,所以完全不可能。
  Ron Couples DrNobelDynamite • a day ago
  I&m not discounting the possibility of nuclear warfare but I don&t see it as anything like a first option if, for example, either Russia or China were to create facts on the ground in the other&s territory.
  In this regard, Putin has first-hand experience with land grabs.
  So far, he&s managed to do it short of nuclear war.
  即使中俄相互侵占领土,使用核武器也不会是他们的首选,当然发生核战的可能性还是有的。
  普京在占领领土方面,拥有相当丰富的经验。到目前为止,普京在没有发动核战争的情况下已经成功占领了他国领土了。
  Sarah Abrams Ron Couples • a day ago
  and what country or people does NOT have &first hand experience with land grabs?
  & WE all do.
  请问,哪个国家或者民族没侵略过他国领土的?
  哪个国家都有。
  Serious Questions Sarah Abrams • a day ago
  But the &all& doesn&t go for current world leaders.
  That seemed to be the distinction being made.
  那是以前,现在哪有所有国家都去侵占别国领土的?
  所以区别就在这里。
  Ron Couples Sarah Abrams • 16 hours ago
  I&ll assume your comment is not in defense of Putin.
  我认为你的评论不是在捍卫普京。
  Tony Wu Ron Couples • 16 hours ago
  So far, he hasn&t invaded any country that has nuclear weapons.
  到目前为止,普京还没有侵略任何拥有核武器的国家
  Ron Couples Tony Wu • 12 hours ago
  I&m not sure that even Putin knows the locations of all of the former Soviet Union&s nuclear weapons.
  前苏联国家的核武器都存在在哪里,这点普京都知道吗?
  TadhgMor • 2 days ago
  I didn&t know anyone outside of neo-con circles still believed in Huntington&s nonsense.
  Tadhgmor 两天前
  我不知道除了新保守派那群人外还有谁相信亨廷顿的废话(大概是指《文明的冲突》)。
  Rhein Ouaiffe TadhgMor • 2 days ago
  You should take a break from your nonstop trolling, come on up out of the basement, and get an education.
  Rhein Ouaiffe 回复 TadhgMOr 两天前
  你应该好好休息一下,不要这样子一直声嘶力竭地咆哮,好好去接受一下教育,不要做井底之蛙。
  TadhgMor Rhein Ouaiffe • 2 days ago
  Says the white supremacist troll, apparently without understanding the irony.
  I have two degrees troll, both of them relevant to this discussion. That&s why I know how ridiculous it is to quote Huntington on this issue. His &Clash of Civilizations& has been widely discredited in most circles. It&s still taught in courses mostly so students can pick apart the tangle of false premises in it.
  TadhgMor 回复 Rhein Ouaiffe
  你称我为白人至上主义者,显然你不知道这里面的讽刺。
  我有两个学位(笑,这俩学位都和这个讨论相关,这就是为什么我知道在这里引用亨廷顿是非常荒谬的。他的《文明的冲突》在大多数圈子中不被信服。课堂里依旧在教授这本书的内容,所以学生们可以狠狠的批评其中的错误。
  Fattyfatman TadhgMor • 2 days ago
  TadhgMor HAS TWO ADVANCED DEGREES!
  One in history and one in IR.
  TadhgMor拥有两条先进的学位!
  一个是历史学位,一个是国际关系学位。
  The_Lord_Your_God Fattyfatman • 2 days ago
  So what, that hardly makes him special on these boards. His take on Huntington is similar to most first year grad students I have known, but most of them eventually overcame their ignorance and saw the writing on the wall.
  有两个学位又怎样?这并不会让他变得特别。他对亨廷顿的见解和我所知道的研一学生无异,但是他们中的大多数都克服了自己的无知并最终看到了不祥之兆。
  TadhgMor The_Lord_Your_God • a day ago
  So you&re an IR specialist?
  What &writing on the wall&?
  Th only people I see defend Huntington&s thesis these days are known bigots and xenophobes.
  I mean his whole idea was massively reductive.
  What defines a &civilization&?
  His definitions are arbitrary.
  所以你是个国际关系专家?
  什么是“不祥之兆”?
  如今,为亨廷顿理论辩护的都是那些盲信着和仇外者。
  我认为他的整个思想是相当简单的。
  ”文明“的定义是什么?
  他对”文明“的定义相当的武断。
  Sarah Abrams TadhgMor • a day ago
  So Allison who has written favorably about Huntington is a xenophobe and a bigot?
  Why don&t you familiarize yourself with the material before you look any more like a child than you already do?
  照你这么说,只要是看好亨廷顿的就是盲信着和仇外者?
  你的观点太幼稚了,亲自去看看他的作品吧。
  TadhgMor Sarah Abrams • 13 hours ago
  I&m familiar with Huntington.
  I&ve read &Clash of Civilizations&.
  Some years back I watched one of the smartest IR scholars I&ve know completely demolish it, and he was German and grew up in a divided Germany so if anyone could talk about how that &clash of civilizations& idea was bunk he could.
  So do you have an actual criticism or are you just trying to defend cheap logic as a facade over bigotry, which is all Huntington did.
  He didn&t like Muslims.
  That&s basically the takeaway from his logic.
  Him and Fukuyama did a good deal of damage to rational IR thought in conservative circles.
  Also, seeing as you upvoted a well known white supremacist on these boards, I really don&t find you a credible source.
  我熟悉亨廷顿的作品,也看过他的《文明的冲突》。多年前一位著名的国际关系专家否定了《文明的冲突》,他是一位德国人,在分裂的德国长大,所以他完全有资格来说明《文明的冲突》其实就是一堆废话。亨廷顿不喜欢穆斯林。这可以在他的作品中看出来。他和福山通过发表保守文章对理性的国际关系思想造成了巨大破坏。
  而且我发现你是个白人至上主义者, 所以我不认为你所说的话是值得信赖的。
  BoomerGal The_Lord_Your_God • a day ago
  Don&t hate. Learn.
  别抱怨,去学习
  Sarah Abrams The_Lord_Your_God • a day ago
  TadhgMor obviously doesn&t have degrees in either History or IR, since he doesn&t know Allison or what Allison has said about Huntington.
  很显然TadhgMor根本没获得历史或者信息检索方面的学位,因为他不根本知道alison对亨廷顿的看法。
  Fattyfatman Sarah Abrams • a day ago
  BLASPHEMY!!
  亵渎!!
  Fattyfatman The_Lord_Your_God • a day ago
  HE IS SPECIAL!!! A SPECIAL PAGAN!
  He&s fighting fascism from the comfort of his basement apartment. He&s fighting fascists like you!!!
  他很特殊!他是个特殊的异教徒!
  他正在他的卧室里反法西斯!,他和你一样反法西斯!
  Sarah Abrams Fattyfatman • a day ago
  Doubtful
  Fattyfatman Sarah Abrams • a day ago
  You don&t recognize greatness when you&re this close to it?
  在你如此接近时你还无法感受到它的伟大?
  sg77 TadhgMor • a day ago
  Do you believe there are no differences in point of view that would amount to a &clash?& What about sectarian differences? I would argue that these are so deep in some regions of the world that they amount to such a clash. For example look at ISIS and the destruction of shrines and historical sites in Mosul.
  你真的以为不存在可以导致冲突的想法差异吗?那你怎么看待人们在宗派上的差异?我认为目前世界上的很多地方正因为宗派之间的差异所以导了很多冲突,比如ISIIS和摩苏尔神殿和历史遗迹的破坏。
  TadhgMor sg77 • a day ago
  I believe the &clash of civilizations& was ignorant bunk, since Huntington couldn&t really define his &civilizations& and the entire notion was predicated on cultural supremacist notions about &the West& which is a construct with limited validity when talking about anything more than political blocs.
  Sectarian would be &internal& in a &civilization& so not what Huntington was discussing. Not to mention sectarian violence is usually a mixture of causes. Take Northern Ireland for example. People outside Ireland love to call it a religious war. People who lived it? Not so much.
  &Sectarian violence& is a shorthand used because it is easy. It&s never the only variable involved.
  我认为《文明的冲突》里面的内容相当的无知,因为亨廷顿无法真正的定义他的“文明”,整个的观念是基于关于“西方”的文化优越主义,在谈论与政治集团无关的事物时,它的有效性是有限的。
  宗派主义是处于一个“文明”的“内部”而不是亨廷顿所讨论的那样。更不用说宗派暴力的起因通常很复杂。就比如北爱尔兰。北爱尔兰以外的人更喜欢称其为宗教战争。
  “宗教暴力”就像速记法,因为它很容易使用。这绝不是唯一的变量。
  timb117 TadhgMor • a day ago
  Huntington really did not like Muslims
  亨廷顿真的不喜欢穆斯林。
  TadhgMor timb117 • a day ago
  No he definitely didn&t. He threw in the &Orthodox civilization& but it pretty clearly looks like the real clash he wanted was with &Islamic civilization&. Which is funny since that encompasses so many diverse groups and ethnicities and countries that it&s completely reductive.
  不,他绝对没有。他抛弃了“东正教文明”但是他显然很希望与“伊斯兰文明”的真正冲突。这很有趣,因为完全还原了很多不同的种族、团体和国家。
  JonF311 TadhgMor • a day ago
  Eastern Europe (the Slavo-Orthodox area) is simply one of Europe&s subcultures not a distinct civilization. Apart from the Mongol era (which lasted for a briefer time than Spain&s domination by the Moors) Russia&s history is fairly parallel with western Europe&s, after about 1000AD.
  东欧(传统斯拉夫区域)是欧洲的一个亚文化而不是一个独特的文明。除了蒙古时代以外(持续的时间比西班牙的摩尔人统治还短)的俄罗斯与西欧的历史是相当满意的,从大约公元1000年以后。
  sg77 TadhgMor • a day ago
  Thank you, I take your point.
  谢谢,学习了
  Ubik sg77 • a day ago
  Actually, that&s a perfect example of one of the foremost critiques of Huntington&s thesis: that he unwisely ignored ethnic, cultural, and religious divisions in favor of conceiving of monolithic &civilizations.& For example, when he argues for an Islamic civilization, he is ignoring both religious (Sunni, Shiite, Alawite, Ibadi, etc.), as well as cultural/ethnic (Arabs, Berbers, Turks, Iranians, etc.) divisions. To use a historical example, the Sunni Turkish Ottoman dynasty fought with the Shiite Iranian Safavids for centuries, yet for Huntington these centuries-old divisions would be eroded to the point of irrelevance.
  In many ways, the work belongs in another time: it has quite a bit in common with the sweeping, general histories of the early 20th century, such as Spengler&s Decline of the West or Toynbee&s A Study of History (or, to use a more recent example that somewhat fits into the mold, Diamond&s Guns, Germs, and Steel). Such approaches to history have generally fallen out of favor among historians, largely due to the significant shortcomings of such approaches, first and foremost among them being that important nuances get lost in the grand sweep of history. When you view history through the lens of monolithic civilizations, you ignore the myriad differences that are tremendously important to consider.
  事实上,这是对亨廷顿的批评的一个范例:他不明智地忽略了种族,文化和宗教分歧,通过这种方式来构想统一的文明形态。例如,当他谈到伊斯兰文明时,他忽略了这两个宗教(逊尼派,什叶派,阿拉维派,Ibadi等)以及文化/种族(阿拉伯人,柏柏尔人,土耳其人,伊朗人等)上的分裂。举个历史上的例子,逊尼派的土耳其奥斯曼王朝与什叶派伊朗沙法维王朝数百年来不断斗阵着,但对于亨廷顿来说,这些历史事实似乎一点都不重要。
  在许多方面上,他的这个作品属于其他的时代:与20世纪初的历史作品有很多相似之处,比如斯宾格勒创作的《西方的落寞》或汤因比的《历史的研究》(以及更近的《***炮,病菌与钢铁》)。这种历史研究方法并不受历史学家们待见,主要是由于这些方法存在着很多不足之处,其中显著的不足之处在于在历史的大叙述之中忽视了一些重要的细微差异。当你通过统一文明的视角来看待历史时,你忽略了无数的差异,而这些差异是非常重要的。
----------------------------------------------我一直在思考一个问题
这个世界到底是谁在管
张友人?释迦牟尼?穆罕默德?耶和华?
回复时间: 16:49
----------------------------------------------岂能尽如人意,但求无愧我心。
回复时间: 23:43

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